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FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT:
THE CASE FOR REVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)1 in 1970
was a major first step in providing consumers with protections against
the previously unregulated consumer information industry.2 Although
the FCRA is the only legislation that currently protects individual
privacy in the consumer marketplace,8 it is the result of a compromise4
which renders it inadequate in today's society.5 This Comment
initially traces the background of the FCRA. It then examines the
protection of consumer privacy and consumer remedies against abuses
by the consumer information industry, in light of recent legislative and
judicial developments. A case is also made for strengthening the
FCRA in two areas: consumer privacy and consumer protection.
Finally, proposals for amending the Act are offered.
R. Tm FCRA-IN PEPsPEcTI
A. Regulation of the Information Merchants
The consumer information industry, consisting of credit bureaus and
investigative reporting agencies,6 collects and disseminates information
upon which decisions are based which control nearly every aspect of
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-t (1970). The Fair Credit Reporting Act, enacted October 26,
1970, became effective April 25, 1971.
2. Comment, The California Consumer Reporting Agencies Act: A Proposed Im-
provement on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 26 HASTNGS L. 1219, 1223 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Calif. CRAA].
3. Statement by Senator William Proxmire Before the Privacy Protection Study
Commission, at 1 (August 3, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Proxmire Privacy Statement].
4. The consumer credit industry-both credit grantors and credit bureaus-opposed
Senator Proxmire's first bill to establish a Fair Credit Reporting Act. The resultant
legislation was the product of bargaining between Senator Proxmire and his staff and the
consumer information industry. The industry cooperated in the enactment of the FCRA
once they felt that it was reasonable and commercially feasible to do so. Hearings on S.
1840 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 741 (1975) (statement of the
International Consumer Credit Association) [hereinafter cited as S. 1840 Hearings];
Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1223.
5. Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at 1.
6. There are two basic categories of "credit reports." The file or ledger report
contains only objective factual information that is easily verifiable, such as a person's
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a person's economic activity, including the granting of credit,7
insurance underwriting, 8 employment, 9 and licensing.10 The impor-
tance of the services provided by the personal information merchants
in today's complex, highly mobile society is unquestioned. Credit
grantors, insurers, employers and landlords are unlikely to know much
-if anything-about the people with whom they do business." The
needs of the users of credit and investigative reports are commensurate
with the ever-increasing demands of consumers for goods and services.
This symbiotic relationship breeds deleterious side-effects: imposi-
tions and limitations on the consumer's right of privacy through a
lack of control over the information that is collected and disseminated
about his personal life.12  Thus the consumer's desire for benefits and
financial and public record data. The investigative report contains objective data and
subjective data concerning a person's general reputation, mode of living, and
character. This latter information is obtained from a person's business associates,
friends, neighbors, or anyone who may have information concerning him. This highly
subjective information, based on value judgments and interpretations of both the inter-
viewees and interviewors is used chiefly by insurance companies, employers and
landlords, who desire as much personal information as possible on which to base their
business decisions. Comment, Constitutional Right of Privacy and Investigative Con-
sumer Reports: Little Brother Is Watching You, 2 HASTINrs CONsT. L.Q. 773, 776
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Little Brother Is Watching].
For a thorough profile of the types and functions of credit reporting and investigative
agencies in the consumer information industry, see Foer, The Personal Information
Market: An Examination of the Scope and Impact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 2
Loy. L. STvDNrs CONSUMER J. 37, 41-53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Foer].
7. Ackerley v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658 (D. Wyo. 1974) (credit
refused on basis of inaccurate file information).
8. Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 528
F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976) (insurance coverage revoked on basis of inaccurate investigative
report).
9. Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1975) (investigative agency
published libelous report to employer).
10. Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1087 (1976) (medical license refused on basis of inaccurate investigative report).
11. See Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1221; Comment, The Fair Credit Reporting
Act-From the Regulators Vantage Point, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 459, 461 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point]; Note, Protecting Privacy in
Credit Reporting, 24 STAN. L. REV. 550, 556 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Protecting
Privacy]. Cf. Joint Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Privacy and Information
Systems of the Comm. on Gov't Operations and the Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 150-51 (1974) (statement of Vincent
P. Barabba, Director, Bureau of the Census) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Hearings];
Butterfield, Data Banks and Privacy Discussed by Data-Keepers, PsyCmMvRIc Nnws
May 7, 1975, reprinted in S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 5, at 711.
12. Credit bureau and investigative agency files often contain material which is
irrelevant to the business purposes for which such reports are used, even though it may
be factually correct. Even material which is relevant may be of a highly personal
nature, yet the subject of the file has little control over who may learn his personal
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privileges, obtainable only from sources which require personal infor-
mation about him, clashes with his desire for privacy.'
Unfortunately, the vast majority of consumers are unaware that their
privacy is being infringed upon by the operations of the information
merchants.14  Unless consumers personally experience the denial of
benefits based upon an erroneous report by a credit reporting or
investigative agency, they are disinterested in potential abuses which
impinge upon their privacy rights.'5  Yet these potential abuses-in
the form of erroneously reported facts' 0-- can leave the consumer with-
out credit, insurance, or employment. Moreover, the consumer can be
forced to accept less satisfactory insurance at higher rates, or even a
lower-paying job.17  In light of such potentially deleterious conse-
quences, Congress found legitimate need for regulating those who
provide personal information for the use of others.'8 Enactment of the
FCRA was a significant step toward protecting the right of the con-
sumer's personal privacy.19 However, it is only a beginning, for it does
not properly balance the individual's expectation of privacy against
business' need to receive certain information relating to the consumer's
credit reliability.
The basic purpose of the FCRA is to insure that the various types
of consumer reporting agencies exercise their important responsibilities
with fairness, impartiality, and with respect for the consumer's right to
privacy.20 The intent of the Act was not to make the acquisition of
history. This can lead to embarrassment, especially when one tries to overcome the
stigma of past indiscretions. An individual's chances of obtaining credit, employment, or
insurance may be jeopardized by a single adverse incident in his record, even though that
incident may be insignificant in predicting his present character. An even greater
hazard facing consumers is the possibility that their file may contain erroneous or
incomplete material which they are unaware of, and thus cannot correct. Protecting
Privacy, supra note 11, at 550.
13. A 1973 report of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare noted that
"[tihere is a widespread belief that personal privacy is essential to our well-being-
physically, psychologically, socially, and morally." Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at
1221.
14. FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point, supra note 11, at 461.
15. Id. at 462.
16. See notes 7-10 supra.
17. Little Brother Is Watching, supra note 6, at 801.
An individual living in a world more and more dominated by large commercial en-
tities is less able to bear the burden of the consequences of a false credit or charac-
ter report than the agency in the business of selling these reports.
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 58 (Ga. 1975).
18. Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 151.
19. Id. at 37 (statement of Elliot L. Richardson).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (1970).
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private information impossible; rather it was to regulate abusive
practices on the part of information merchants.21 Implementation of
the objectives of the Act is achieved by the creation of certain rights
in the consumer: (1) the right to be notified whenever any adverse
action is taken on the basis of a consumer report, including the
name and address of the supplier and the nature of the adverse infor-
mation;22 (2) the right to learn the nature and substance of one's file
from the consumer reporting agency, with the exception of medical
information and sources of investigative information; 2 (3) the right to
be told the non-investigative sources in one's file, and the names of
individuals who have received reports;2 4 (4) the right to have a con-
sumer report disclosed only for legitimate business purposes (e.g.,
credit, insurance, employment), or in connection with governmental
licensing or benefits which require it;25 (5) the right to dispute and/or
have corrected inaccurate or unverifiable information;20 (6) the right
to know that an investigative report may be, or is being made and the
opportunity to request disclosure of the nature and scope of the investi-
gation, . 7 with the right to have any adverse investigative infor-
mation re-verified before it can be included in any report made more
than three months after receipt of such adverse information;28 (7) the
right to have certain obsolete data removed from the consumer
report;29 and (8) the right to bring a civil suit for willful 0 and negli-
gent' noncompliance with provisions of the Act.82  There is strong
21. Foer, On the Consumption of Consumer Reports: A Guide to the Investigating
Lawyer 14, cited in S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 67. These merchants consist of
essentially 2500 credit bureaus and a small number of investigative reporting companies,
Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 464, which collectively maintain files on over 100
million consumers. See S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 20.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (1970).
23. Id. § 1681g. However, the consumer does not have the right to be given
physical access to, or copies of, his reports. Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 464,
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (1970). This information is restricted to the previous six
months for credit or insurance purposes, and to the preceding two years for employment
purposes. Id.
25. Id. § 1681b. The consumer has the right not to have anything more than
identifying information disclosed to governmental agencies, unless by court order. Id. §
1681f.
26. Id. § 1681i.
27. Id. § 1681d. The consumer does not have the right to know if an investigative
report is being made for employment purposes. Id.
28. Id. § 16811.
29. Id. § 1681c.
30. Id. § 1681n.
31. Id. § 1681o.
32. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMmIssIoN BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECON,
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evidence, however, that despite the conferral of these rights upon the
consumer, abusive practices persist.33 It is primarily in the area of
investigative reports that the more serious problems exist.8 4
Senator William Proxmire, chief advocate for strengthening FCRA
consumer protections, has long recognized the deficiencies in the
original Act, but has been unsuccessful in his efforts to amend it.3" The
debate over whether or not to expand the consumer's protection against
the consumer information industry has raged between such groups as
the Federal Trade Commission, civil libertarians, and consumer advo-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDr REPORTING Acr (2d ed. May 7, 1973) (discussion
of provisions and requirements of the FCRA designed to assist the business community
in understanding the Federal Trade Commission's interpretation of the Act).
33. Inaccurate information continues to appear in consumer reporting files, primarily
because of human fallibility compounded by lax hiring practices, policies emphasizing
production quantity over quality, and encouragement of the development of adverse
information. Little Brother Is Watching, supra note 6, at 777-82.
34. R. ROmNER, MEMORANDUM ON FCRA AMENDMENTS, COMM. PRINT No. 2 of S.
1840, at 2 (April 26, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Comivm. PRiNT No. 2].
Investigative reports, by definition, are those in which information about an individ-
ual's character, morals or life-style is collected by personal contact with neighbors,
friends and other associates. The information is subjective, and the method of col-
lection can create invasion of privacy problems.
Id.
35. Senator Proxmire introduced S. 2360, a bill designed to strengthen the FCRA, in
1973 and conducted hearings in 1973 on the issue of balancing the interests of consumer
privacy rights with the interests of creditors, insurers, and employers to have sufficient
information to pass on consumer applications. However, S. 2360 was tabled. Addition-
al hearings were conducted in 1974 which focused on procedures used by consumer
reporting agencies to gather information for consumer reports. In mid-1975, Senator
Proxmire introduced S. 1840. Thereafter, hearings took place on the issue of increasing
consumer protections under the Act. S. 1840 was then redrafted to deal exclusively with
investigative consumer reports. In this form, it will be introduced in the 95th Congress.
COMm. Pnir No. 2, supra note 34, at 1; Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at
11; Telephone interview with Joseph Fish, Senator Alan Cranston's Legislative Assistant,
Los Angeles Office, August 6, 1976. See generally S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4;
Hearings on Amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act Before the Subcomm. on Consum-
er Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); Hearings on S. 2360 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
[hereinafter cited as S. 2360 Hearings].
Senator Proxmire summarized some basic deficiencies in the present FCRA before the
Privacy Protection Study Commission:
Under the present law, consumers get no prior notification that reports will be
prepared about them. Only in the case of investigative reports. . . is the consumer
even told afterwards that a report has been or may be prepared. Of all the infor-
mation that might be collected, medical information is certainly the most sensitive
and personal. Yet to this day consumers who sign medical authorization forms
have no clear indication of the virtually indiscriminate uses that may be made of
that data in the future.
The present law requires that when a consumer is denied credit, insurance or em-
ployment on the basis of a report, he be advised of the identity of the reporting
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cates on one side, and consumer reporting agencies, insurance under-
writers, and creditors on the other side.86
This debate has focused upon the competing interests of the indi-
vidual's right of privacy and business' need to know, the cost of collect-
ing information and the need for accuracy, and finally, the minimum
versus the maximum allowable rights of each individual consumer.a8
The consumer reporting agencies have consistently, adamantly, and
unanimously maintained that the FCRA is overwhelmingly successful
in fulfilling Congress' express intent.38  Armed with statistics revealing
extremely small numbers of consumer complaints-compared to the
millions of consumer reports issued-the reporting agencies contend
that the casualties of consumer reporting abuses are negligible.80 They
have even rationalized the reported consumer complaints (except
those apparent few caused by mere clerical errors) by contending that
the complainants had no legitimate grievances against the reporting
agencies, but rather were disgruntled over being denied benefits by the
agency which supplied the report. But denials of benefits, or increases in the
charges for those benefits, are not the only adverse actions that a consumer report
may precipitate, and the Act leaves those other possibilities untouched. I under-
stand, also, that earlier testimony before this Commission revealed that many life
insurance companies make their decisions on the basis of reports supplied by the
Medical Information Bureau, even though that Bureau's own bylaws prohibit such
reliance. Here is one clear case where consumers are being affected by reports they
may never know have been made.
The most common complaint I have heard from consumers about the Fair Credit
Reporting Act is that they cannot get full access to their own files when they go
to the reporting agency for that purpose. All the present law requires is that the
agency disclose to the consumer the 'nature and substance' of the information. This
means that reporting agency employees can excerpt the file contents orally to the
consumer and satisfy their legal obligation, without allowing the consumer to ac-
tually see or handle the file itself. Further, if the consumer wishes to challenge
the information in the file, he may do so, but there is no requirement in the law
that the reporting agency tell him of this right, or of his right to file a written state-
ment which must be included in subsequent reports.
Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at 5-6.
36. See COMM. PRINT No. 2, supra note 34, at 2.
37. Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1222.
38. Many statements made by credit reporting agencies, investigative reporting agen-
cies, credit grantors, and insurance underwriters in the S. 1840 Hearings contained
conclusions indicating that the FCRA is working well and fulfilling its Congressional
objectives. See, e.g., S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 549, 567, 617, 663, 687.
39. The FTC claimed that it had received some 20,000 complaints during the four
years subsequent to the effective date of the FCRA, but Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.
(a trade association representing approximately 1,800 credit bureaus which produce an
estimated 100 million credit reports annually) analyzed the FTC complaints pursuant to
a freedom of information request and discovered only 682 bona fide complaints out of
approximately 600 million issued consumer reports. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at
20, 122.
The following remarks of W. Lee Burge, President of Retail Credit Co. (subsequently
renamed EQUIFAX, Inc.), the largest investigative reporting agency in the country,
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users of the reports.40 These arguments tend to exculpate the con-
sumer reporters from responsibility for consumer complaints, and place
the blame on the consumers themselves.
In addition to their statistical "front-line" justification for retaining
the present FCRA intact, the information merchants have offered a
"second-line" justification, characterized as a self-regulation theory.
This position favors the status quo on the basis that certain consumer
reporting agencies currently follow self-prescribed codes or principles
of conduct which are in complete harmony with the FCRA.41 The
principles of conduct espoused by the agencies allegedly protect con-
sumers, as does the FCRA, yet they do not hamper the interchange of
information needed for consumers to do business in the financial com-
munity.4" In recent hearings on amending the FCRA, one representa-
tive of the credit reporting industry pointed out that FCRA regulations
prescribing file disclosure for credit bureaus were similar to procedures
undertaken prior to the Act, when disclosure was voluntary.43 Thus,
the credit reporting groups argue that they are a self-regulating
typify the industry's rather casual attitude toward consumer reporting abuses:
It is true that mistakes are occasionally made in our industry. There are cases
of mistaken identity which occur. A father's record may be confused with that of
his son. A wrong address. Arguments about credit with a retail store or financial
institution. A payment which may have been made by someone and not yet re-
corded in the maze of an accounting system-computerized or otherwise.
We diligently keep close records on the number of errors in Retail Credit Com-
pany reports, and of the millions of consumer reports we make each year, the num-
ber of errors is minute.
Nevertheless, we continue to strive to reduce errors to the irreducible minimum.
Certainly we fully realize our solemn responsibility to see that no harm comes to
any individual through our errors. It is in our own enlightened self-interest to do
so. If it is true-and it is true-that a customer will not buy information for which
he has no use, then it is even more true that he will not pay for information that
is inaccurate. My company simply could not have grown, expanded, and been suc-
cessful in serving business for the last 70 years if it did not keep errors to a rea-
sonable minimum.
Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 652-53 (emphasis added). See S. 1840 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 734-37.
40. See S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 125-26; Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at
651-52.
41. For example, TRW Credit Data, the largest automated computerized credit agency
in the country (maintaining credit reports on over 50,000,000 consumers) had a code of
ethics which preceded the FCRA. TRW CRET DATA, CoDE OF ETHcs (1972).
42. In order for the business community to do business and extend credit it must
evaluate each risk and base its decisions on factual data. It is the information
merchants' business to provide information to the decision makers, so that the consumer
and the businessman will have an opportunity to make credit decisions. See Privacy
Hearings, supra note 11, at 650. Reporting agencies attempt to maintain the most
accurate and current information in a consumer's file to prevent any impairment of
business transactions. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 644.
43. Problems can arise when a consumer seeking a benefit is turned down. Frequent-
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industry,4" and that in spite of the FCRA, they have successfully pro-
tected consumer rights while serving the needs of business. 45
Under close analysis, the arguments supplied by the information
merchants are illusory; they are merely a clever alchemization of
quantitative data into qualitative conclusions. First, industry self-regu-
lation is simply not adequate to protect crucial consumer privacy con-
siderations, as industry goodwill is not an effective policing medium.40
Second, the seemingly low statistical measure of consumer reporting
abuse belies assertions that the FCRA is functioning smoothly, for it
ignores a basic premise on which the Act was founded: respect for
the consumer's right to privacy.
4 7
B. The Basis for the Consumer's Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized a "right to privacy," under
the United States Constitution. 4s This guarantee protects against inter-
ly the reporting bureau's interviewer is unable to tell the consumer why he was denied
credit when disclosing the nature and substance of the report.
Sometimes in these situations, the consumer is convinced that all of the information
in his file has not been disclosed. Supposedly, these dissatisfied persons want to
be able to handle their files or to be able to obtain hard copies of report informa-
tion. But logic should make it clear that such suspicious persons would believe that
a second file or report was being withheld, even if they would be permitted to read
the actual file or to obtain a hard copy of the report. And it is important to note
that these situations did not arise when credit bureau file disclosure was voluntary
before the advent of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 739 (statement of the International Consumer Credit
Assoc.).
44. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
45. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
46. Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at 12, 13. This is evidenced by recent
litigation where goodwill was so evidently lacking. See, e.g., Ackerley v. Credit Bureau
Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658 (D. Wyo. 1974); Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F.
Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1974), afld, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976); Nitti v. Credit Bureau,
Inc., 375 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1975). For further in-depth analysis of recent litigation, see
notes 113-83 infra and accompanying text.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (4) (1970).
48. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Seven justices concurred in the
opinion, holding that privacy is protected within the "penumbras" of the Constitution
and is enforceable against adverse state action through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court, however, disagreed on the theory used to reach that
conclusion. Justice Douglas found the right of privacy to be implicit in the Bill of
Rights, protected by the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. Justices
Goldberg, Warren and Brennan determined that the right of privacy is one of the
additional fundamental rights protected by the ninth amendment. And Justices Harlan
and White relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect the
citizen's privacy.
The following excerpt from the testimony of Virginia H. Knauer, Special Assistant to
the President for Consumer Affairs, before the Senate Subcommittee during the S. 1840
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ference with an individual's right to have personal activities and infor-
mation kept within the parameters of the individual's control.49 The
remedies for invasions of this right have been previously limited to
situations in which abuses have amounted to the abridgment of funda-
mental constitutional guarantees. 50 The range of these fundamental
guarantees has been slow to expand, occurring only in response to what
the courts have deemed "extraordinary circumstances." 51
The Constitution's "penumbra' of privacy does not yet extend its
protection as far as does the common law,52 which protects privacy
through four main torts:
To date the law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion
of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by
a common name; but otherwise have almost nothing in common except
that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff 'to
be let alone.' . . .53
Given these two potential sources of privacy protection, it would
appear that potential consumer-plaintiffs would have a cause of action
when information merchants gather and disseminate personal infor-
Hearings further supports the citizen's right to privacy in both the governmental and
private sectors:
Consumers have a vital interest in the collection, storage, and dissemination of
information regarding their credit-worthiness, insurability, and employability. The
manner and methods of handling this information impact on the consumer not only
with regard to his ability to receive certain benefits in the marketplace, but also
with regard to his ability to insure personal privacy.
This interest was recognized by the Privacy Act of 1974, which found that the
right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution
and that an individual's privacy is directly affected by the collection, maintenance,
use, and dissemination of personal information.
S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 623. But see Little Brother Is Watching, supra note 6,
at 796: "Individual privacy has not been protected by the courts when it was found to be
outweighed by the public interest;" see S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 741-42
(statement of the International Consumer Credit Association).
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1971) (a woman has a right to privacy
concerning the determination of whether or not to have an abortion); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971) (the right of privacy includes the right of an indi-
vidual to be free of governmental intrusion into matters affecting the personal judgment
of whether to have a child). Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
50. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939
(1964); Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300, 1303 (D. Minn. 1976), citing Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964). See Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2597-98
(1976), citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 399 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969). See also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941).
51. Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300, 1304 (D. Minn. 1976).
52. Id.
53. W. PRossER, HANDnooK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971). For an in-
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mation about their activities and their financial status. Despite these
sources of protection, however, the consumer has difficulty seeking
redress, due to the qualified privileges accorded to reporting agencies
by the FCRA.5 4  Consequently, the FCRA allows violations of the
protected right of privacy; and the true indicia of the FCRA's inef-
fectiveness are the abuses themselves which have occurred-and are
occurring-as the result of this lack of protection in the Act. 5
These deficiencies have been systematically exposed 0 through testi-
mony focusing upon three areas in which the FCRA needs strengthen-
ing: coverage, clarity and liability.57  The major issues involve the
need for stronger protections for consumer privacy, more viable remedies
to deter violations of the Act, and adequate compensation for those
who are wronged by violations.
The Federal Trade Commission, which has responsibility for ad-
ministering the FCRA,58 has noted that consumers often fail to under-
stand why they have no right to control the commercial dissemination
of personal information. This stems from the fact that the Act's basic
purpose is remedial rather than preventive; it provides consumers
with the right to correct erroneous information which only comes to
their attention after denial of credit. 59 Thus, under the current law,
depth discussion of the four torts, see id. at 804-12.
54. See notes 123-29 infra and accompanying text.
55. See generally Little Brother Is Watching, supra note 6, at 778-82, which examines
basic abuses of investigative reporting permitted by the FCRA, i.e., unrealistic produc-
tion goals forcing "short-cut" reporting; quotas on adverse information superseding
accurate information gathering; failure to verify inaccurate public record information;
outright evasion of the FCRA's minimal consumer protections. See S. 1840 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 89-104 (statement of Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher, Privacy lournal),
for several factual situations where different types of consumer reporting abuses occurred
(e.g., deceptions in gathering information by investigators, inaccuracy in reporting,
prejudicial reporting, unfair information practices). Privacy Hearings, supra note 11,
at 467. See also Fialka, The Information Seekers: Your Privacy Is Their Concern,
Washington Star-News, May 25, 1974 reprinted in Privacy Hearings, supra note 11,
at 2025-29; cf. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 679 (testimony regarding improper
use of credit reports, for example, prostitution ring running credit checks on its custo-
mers). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (4), (b) (1970); notes 20 & 21 supra and
accompanying text.
56. See S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 16, 622; Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at
1230; FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point, supra note 11, at 480-81; Protecting Privacy,
supra note 11, at 560-61.
57. Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 467. The basic approach of the FCRA is
sound, but in order for it to be effective, it must be improved, particularly in the areas of
access to the consumer's file, the nature of the notice furnished to the consumer by the
report user, the civil liability provisions, and coverage relating to governmental entities
involved in consumer reporting activities. Id. at 465.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (1970).
59. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 11.
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consumers are not conscious participants in the vast information
industry which collects and distributes data. 0 It is essential that the
burden of correcting abuses be shifted from the consumer to the infor-
mation merchants so that the individual will cease to be an unin-
formed victim, and will instead become the master of his own infor-
mation.0'
III. CONSUMER PRIVACY
A. Striking a Balance
The right to privacy has been defined in a variety of ways.62  The
most important definition embraces the concept of intelligent control
over the collection and dissemination of information concerning one's
personal affairs.6 3 The consumer must know what type of information
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id.; Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 154.
Lack of consumer education is a major problem which must be considered in making
the consumer an active participant in the collection and distribution of his personal data.
Unless the consumer is made aware of his rights, the law will be of little value to him.
This problem is demonstrated by the following observations of a recent commentator
who took an informal survey of consumers who were notified of an adverse credit report
in compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1970):
[Less than twenty-five per cent of those persons notified of an adverse credit
report went to the credit bureau identified, but the reasons given ran the gamut from
distrust of the bureau, misunderstanding of their right to challenge information, to
the inconvenience of making the visit in light of the benefit (another new credit
account) being sought. Some consumers stated that they just thought it would not
do any good to visit the bureau.
FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point, supra note 11, at 472. But see S. 1840 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 134 (statement of Donald W. Ogden, President, Credit Bureau of
Monroe, Inc.), indicating that the reporting industry has been active, from a publicity
standpoint since passage of the FCRA, in explaining its operations and consumer
rights relative to those operations.
62. Courts have defined the right of privacy as a purely personal right to be let
alone, or to live a life of seclusion, or to be free from unwarranted publicity, or
to live without unwarranted interference by the public into matters about which the
public is not generally concerned.
Comment, Fair Credit Reporting Act: Constitutional Defects of the Limitation of
Liability Clause, 11 Hous. L. REv. 424, 426 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FCRA:
Constitutional Defects].
63. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 11; Little Brother Is Watching, supra note 6, at
775.
IBM developed four basic principles of privacy in recognition of the country's concern
with preserving the individual's right to privacy in the face of expanding information
needs by both government and the private sector. The following principles first
appeared in an advertisement in TME, NEWsWEEK, and U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
July 8, 1974:
1. Individuals should have access to information about themselves in record-keep-
ing systems. And there should be some procedure for individuals to find out how
this information is being used.
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is being sought, as well as the manner in which that information will
be collected, in order to make an informed decision about whether to
permit the collection and dissemination of such data.64
The pressing problem with the current FCRA is that an imbalance
exists which weighs heavily in favor of the reporting industry;
consumers do not have adequate control over their commercially main-
tained personal information. 5 As a result, invasions of consumer
privacy60 can occur in varying degrees, which may result in injuries
ranging from embarrassment to defamation.
67
It is even possible for a consumer's privacy to be invaded without
his knowledge. 68 In Kelley v. Rinkle,69 a recent Texas Supreme Court
case, this issue was raised in relation to a statute of limitations problem.
The plaintiff brought a libel action after being reported to a credit
agency's subscriber as owing money on a past-due account. The court
held that the statute of limitations for a libel action for publication of
a defamatory report to a credit agency begins to run when the person
defamed learns or should have learned of the existence of the report.
7 0
It also recognized that in many cases a consumer may not learn of the
existence of a libelous credit report until several months after its publi-
cation to the credit agency.71 The Texas court further acknowledged
2. There should be some way for an individual to correct or amend an inaccurate
record.
3. An individual should be able to prevent information from being improperly dis-
closed or used for other than authorized purposes without his or her consent, unless
required by law.
4. The custodian of data files containing sensitive information should take reason-
able precautions to be sure that the data are reliable and not misused.
Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 669.
64. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 11.
65. For example, in the area of investigative reports, the FCRA does not restrict the
reporting of such highly personal information as a person's sex habits or political
affiliations. FCRA: Constitutional Defects, supra note 62, at 430.
66. The courts consider the following factors in determining whether or not an
individual's privacy has been unconstitutionally invaded: "(1) invasion of personal
privacy or privacy of the home; (2) actual harm; (3) balancing of other interests; and
(4) existence of less restrictive alternatives." Little Brother Is Watching, supra note 6,
at 791.
67. See id. at 803-04; Protecting Privacy, supra note 11, at 554.
"A reputation is a fragile thing-there is no such thing as complete vindication when
false rumors are circulated." Comment, Panacea or Placebo? Actions for Negligent
Noncompliance Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1070, 1074
(1974) [hereinafter cited as FCRA Negligent Noncompliance].
68. See Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1233, where it is noted that medical informa-
tion will often be released without the consumer's consent or awareness.
69. 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976).
70. Id. at 949.
71. Id.
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significant potential for abuse by those who would use credit informa-
tion systems to wrongfully injure the consumer's credit reputation.72 A
consumer with no control over the sale of personal information will
have no reason to suspect that his report might contain erroneous or
defamatory information until it is too late; until the report has already
been furnished to a reporting agency or user.73
The foundational right of individuals to retain a "vital, real and
proprietary interest '74 in personal information that is obtained and
stored by others was recognized by Congress when it enacted the
Privacy Act of 1974.75  Although the purpose of the Privacy Act
is to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information
systems maintained solely by federal agencies,7 6  the fundamental
principles of privacy which govern the agencies are applicable to
the FCRA as well. The two legislative schemes are in fact ana-
logous in the areas of information disclosure,77 access to records,78
notations of dispute,70 and civil remedies, 0 but the Privacy Act affords
greater protection to the individual's right of privacy. This additional
protection is particularly apparent in the critical areas relating to access
and relevancy of information."1 Access by consumers to their files can
be considered one of the best guarantees of the right to privacy.2
Moreover, a guarantee that file information which is dispensed to
72. Id.
73. Id. The FTC noted, for example, a justification for the individual's right to
control his own information in reports prepared for employment purposes, where an
applicant could lose a job or advancement opportunity as a result of an inaccurate or
defamatory report:
[An employment applicant has a special need to be alerted to possible inaccuracies
in information supplied to a potential employer before the employer sees that infor-
mation. The applicant may or may not be able to offer proof of inaccuracy to the
employer, but at least will be able to present a claim of inaccuracy.
S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 28. Cf. Protecting Privacy, supra note 11, at 560.
74. Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at 2.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V, 1975).
76. Id. § 552a(5).
77. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (c) (Supp. V, 1975) with 15 U.S.C. H9 1681d,
1681f, 1681g, 1681h (1970).
78. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (Supp. V, 1975) with 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (1970).
79. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (4) (Supp. V, 1975) with 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (1970).
80. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (Supp. V, 1975) with 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1970).
81. The Privacy Act provides for access to records, permitting visual inspection and
the right to copy, for which the FCRA does not provide. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (Supp. V,
1975). The Privacy Act also contains a relevancy provision which restricts the
information an agency can maintain on an individual to that which is relevant and
necessary for that agency's particular purposes. Id. § 552a(e).
82. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 3 (statement of Senator Proxmire). The
Federal Trade Commission fully supports the individual's right to have full access to
personal information held in the files of government and private organizations. Privacy
19773
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report users is correct, complete, and relevant is necessary to insure
that the consumer's privacy will not be impinged upon any more than
is absolutely necessary."' Affording the individual protections in the
private sector that are already guaranteed by the federal government
would be the first step in striking a fair balance between the consumer's
limited privacy and the reporting industry's need to utilize information
for legitimate business purposes.8 4
Hearings, supra note 11, at 460. See S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 624-25 for
further governmental support of legislation which would allow consumer access to files.
83. Id. at 3.
What kinds of information are really necessary for purposes of insurance, employ-
ment, and creditworthiness beyond known performance standards?
Does it really make a difference in the cancellation of automobile insurance to
know that a female policy holder has a "hippie-type" son? This critical question
of relevancy must ultimately be resolved by the consumer reporting industry. It
is indeed difficult to legislate relevancy effectively-the market-place is in the better
position to deal directly with this problem through adequate disclosure.
Id. at 626 (statement of Virginia Knauer, Special Assistant to the President for
Consumer Affairs).
Information is said to be irrelevant for its intended use when the data in no way
relates to the purpose or decision for which the report was compiled. Although
irrelevant information is not necessarily harmful, often this type of information
covers highly personal matters generally considered within an individual's protected
area of privacy.
FCRA: Constitutional Defects, supra note 62, at 430. See Protecting Privacy, supra
note 11, at 555 (irrelevant data enables report users to make ostensible business decisions
on the basis of personal bias).
Contra, S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 610 (statement of the Consumer Bankers
Association).
[The] search for information is not a vicarious trip into the customer's private
life. The customer expects to be investigated and he very, very rarely even suffers
from the procedure. The question of relevant information gathering by the loan
officers is difficult to address because of the variety of circumstances presented by
loan applicants. What may be relevant in one loan situation may not be relevant
in another.
Id. Cf. Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 471 (the FTC is convinced that limiting the
collection of "relevant" information is not feasible).
A relevancy issue was decided in a recent case against a defendant reporting agency
which provided subscribing merchants with names and check cashing histories of
thousands of individuals with whom they would never do business. Preliminary injunc-
tive relief was granted to a plaintiff class consisting of all persons whose names had
been passed or presently appeared on various lists collected and disseminated. The court
noted that since information on a particular consumer may only be provided to a report
user who requires it for a specific transaction with that particular consumer, the
defendant's practices clearly failed to comply with the FCRA. Greenway v. Information
Dynamics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1096 (D. Ariz. 1974). But cf. Herring v. Retail
Credit Co., 224 S.E.2d 663 (S.C. 1976) (the inclusion and reporting of public record
information did not violate the FCRA or invade the consumer's privacy).
84. Senator Proxmire, in his testimony before the Privacy Protection Study Commis-
sion, divided privacy protection into three critical ingredients which are needed to
properly balance consumer and reporting needs:
The first and most important is that consumers give their informed consent to
the collection and distribution of information about themselves. This means that
an individual is entitled to know the purpose for which information is collected, the
1977] FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
B. Bifurcation of the FCRA
A further modification necessary to effectuate the balancing of con-
sumer and consumer reporting interests is the bifurcation of the FCRA
into two distinct acts: one dealing with credit reports; the other dealing
with investigative reports.8 5 Nearly all consumer reporting abuses
exposed in recent hearings on proposed amendments to the Act
concerned investigative reporting. 86 This is an area where the greatest
potential for invasion of privacy exists. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that the FCRA is adequate with respect to credit
bureaus that merely collect and distribute ledger information.87 There
is no question that factual errors do occur which can injure the con-
sumer.88 However, erroneous data contained in credit reports are
generally more accessible and easier to correct than information found
in investigative reports.8 9 The key to improving consumer protection
kinds of information sought and the kinds of sources to be contacted, and where
and how that information will be stored, and how it will be used.
It may be fair to say that consumers impliedly consent to reports about them
when those reports are nothing more than routine collections of their credit his-
tories gathered in connection with a credit application. But the consumer's consent
to a broad-ranging investigation of his or her character, morals and life-style is not
so easily implied from a simple application for insurance or employment.
Secondly, the individual must be able to know when that information has been
used against him, and by whom. Otherwise we give approval to secret decisionmak-
ing processes which the consumer is powerless to confront or challenge.
Lastly, the consumer is entitled to an assurance that information about him that
is collected and distributed by consumer reporting agencies is accurate, complete
and relevant to the purposes for which it is used. This is nothing more than funda-
mental fairness. The credit or insurance or employment applicant ought not be the
subject of slipshod investigative techniques, or haphazard data collection, or of dis-
torted recording, reporting or evaluation methods. A heavy burden ought to rest
on the reporting agencies to assure that their procedures and their reports are as
accurate and thorough as possible. And the insurance actuaries ought to be made
to justify their claimed "need" for subjective and personal information. Even more
importantly, consumers must have a chance to see for themselves exactly what is
in their files, and must have an effective opportunity to challenge inaccurate in-
formation.
Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at 3-4. See also S. 3349, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976). This bill, known as the "Bill of Rights Procedures Act of 1976," was introduced
to protect citizens' privacy rights with regard to bank records, credit records, telephone
records; mail covers, service monitoring; and nonverbal communications. While primari-
ly intended to prevent any sort of governmental access to, inter alia, an individual's
credit records without the individual's authorization, it supports the basic premise that
the individual is entitled to control over private record information. It also recognizes
the need to strengthen consumer privacy protection.
85. S. 1840 was amended to deal exclusively with stronger regulation of investigative
reporting agencies. Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at 11.
86. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 144.
87. Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at 12.
88. See note 156 infra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Know Your Rights Under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, A Checklist for Consumers (1972); Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.,
Credit Bureaus and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (1971).
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is through better notification procedures,90 and stronger remedial
measures for FCRA violations.9 Credit bureaus adamantly support
bifurcation of the FCRA because they do not want to be associated
with investigative agencies which have been responsible for nearly all
derogatory publicity associated with the consumer reporting industry. 2
The International Consumer Credit Association has gone so far as to
say that combining the regulation of credit and investigative reports
into one law has irreparably damaged the reputations of ethical, bona
fide credit bureaus.93
While the underlying premise is that investigative reports inherently
contradict the constitutional right of privacy,94 these reports serve the
legitimate needs of insurers and employers who must protect
themselves against unreasonable risks.95 Despite this purported legiti-
mate need for highly subjective information, the insurance companies'
claims that they require such information are unsubstantiated." Yet
90. See notes 69-81 supra and accompanying text.
91. See generally notes 131-86 infra and accompanying text.
92. See S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 136, 739-40. Associated Credit Bureaus,
Inc. has set forth the following list of misconceptions about credit bureaus which they
feel result in unfair publicity:
1) Credit bureau files are not secret and anyone is entitled to know what is in the
file about him, including the names of sources.
2) Any individual may challenge any information about him in a credit bureau file,
correct it if it is in error or have his side of the dispute reported whenever the infor-
mation is disseminated.
3) Credit bureaus do not gather information about personal habits, morals, charac-
teristics, etc., and do not employ outside investigators to interview neighbors or
friends. Such reports are known as 'investigative reports' and are compiled for in-
surance companies by other consumer reporting organizations-not by credit bu-
reaus.
4) Only persons with a permissible purpose may have access to a credit report, and
those purposes are spelled out in the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.
Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 520.
93. See S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 739.
94. Little Brother Is Watching, supra note 6, at 802.
95. Id.
In the credit industry alone hundreds of millions of dollars rest upon decisions re-
garding the extension of credit to individuals. The decisionmakers must be in-
formed about a person's solvency and reliability. Automobile insurers need to know
a person's driving record and other pertinent facts before taking the risk of insuring
that person. Life insurance companies should know the medical history and the
physical condition of the applicant, as well as the hobbies and interests of the appli-
cant if they involve special dangers such as skydiving or mountain-climbing. An
employer should know the experience and abilities of a prospective employee and
the educational background of the applicant and his characteristics which might de-
termine suitability for a particular assignment. The filing of such information
holds certain cost-saving efficiencies which are helpful in the business world. The
information thus gathered allows for "statistical stereotyping" as a means of making
a large number of decisions in the shortest amount of time.
Id.
96. Id. at 804. No actuarial tables exist concerning the additional risks involved in
insuring, for example, unmarried couples who live together.
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this personal information, which is irrelevant and often based upon the
opinions of third persons, is routinely gathered and filed by investigative
reporters, thereby violating the consumer's personal privacy.1
7
Employers utilize the same kind of personal information in evalu-
ating prospective or advancing employees.9" One justification for
this practice was advanced by the National Association of Manu-
facturers:
It is naive to anticipate that persons, whose names are supplied as
references by the applicant or employee, will supply -the same quality
of information -as would be contained in the investigative consumer
report.
99
Possibilities for error and invasions of privacy are much greater with
investigative reports than with credit reports.100 Consequently, differ-
ent controls are needed to. protect consumers from the inherently
different kinds of consumer reports. The answer lies in bifurcation of
the Act.
The first method of control is to give consumers the opportunity to
consent to the collection and use of any personal information.' Prag-
matically, it is doubtful that anyone would decline to authorize a re-
quired investigative report when applying for credit. 0 2  Providing the
consumer with the option to do so, however, would allow informed
consent to the compilation of personal information.0 3 If he did not
97. See id. at 797. But see S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 597 (in underwriting
insurance policies, investigative reports are usually only ordered when doubts have arisen
over the acceptability of a risk or its premium determination. Without them, it would be
simple for underwriters to reject outright any risk). See also id. at 605-07, and 592-95
(for analysis of the insurance underwriting process and the use of investigative reports).
98. See S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 715-31 (comments of Thomas W. Norton,
President of Fidelifacts/Metropolitan New York, Inc., which specializes in obtaining
information for use by prospective employers in making hiring decisions; by corporate
executives to check on merger and acquisition prospects; by security executives to
uncover fraud, theft, and other criminal activities; and by the legal profession in civil and
criminal pre-trial matters).
99. Id. at 749.
100. Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1245.
101. [o mandate prior consent in this particular field is critical to insure the in-
dividual's rights. It places the consumer in the position of being able to make an
intelligent, knowing choice in that he can choose to sacrifice some of his privacy
in exchange for a benefit such as credit, insurance, or employment. It is essential,
first, that the individual be aware that he is making a trade-off and second, that
he be allowed to make his decision in an informed manner.
S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 625.
102. See Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1245.
103. See FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point, supra note 11, at 459. For the position
of the American Life Insurance Association, disfavoring authorization for investigative
reports, see S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 586.
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wish to be investigated, the benefit could be sacrificed in order to
preserve his right to privacy. 04 At the very least, this is the
consumer's choice; he thereby assumes an active rather than a passive
role in the reporting process.
This active consumer role is particularly important when medical
information is gathered. Under current law, a consumer who signs a
standardized authorization form to release medical information to an
insurance company is unaware that his personal medical data may be
used by the company for non-insurance purposes. Examples include:
(1) compilation of medical information for employment purposes; (2)
use of case histories by training physicians; or (3) unauthorized incor-
poration of data in official reports on the consumer's physicial condition
to supervisory agencies. 0 5 If consumers are provided with the right to
prior authorization of such reporting, they will be capable of effectively
determining the use to which their personal medical information is put.'00
The second method of control necessary to protect consumers from
investigative reporting abuses is disclosure of sources.' 07  Under
present law, investigative agencies only have to reveal the "nature and
substance"' 08 of the information in the consumer's file; sources must
104. See note 102 supra and accompanying text. The National Association of
Independent Insurers feels that it is unlikely that a good insurance risk would refuse to
give authorization for an investigative report. It suggests that declining such authoriza-
tion would reflect the consumer's reluctance to have certain information, which probably
would have an important bearing on the risk to be assumed, disclosed. The Association
foresees "countless applicants for insurance being turned away because of the suspicions
which are aroused," and insurance binders being given only "under the most crystal clear
of situations." All this would result in a tighter market for insurance. S. 1840
Hearings, supra note 4, at 598.
105. Proxmire Privacy Statement, supra note 3, at 10, 11.
106. For insight into the operation of the Medical Information Bureau, a nonprofit
trade association owned and controlled by some 700 member life insurance companies,
see S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 629-40.
107. A consumer who finds himself the subject of a credit, insurance or employment
investigative report cannot reasonably be expected to protect himself from potentially
harmful or inaccurate opinions or data supplied by anonymous sources, unless he has the
right to disclosure of those anonymous sources. FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point,
supra note 11, at 474-76. According to the Federal Trade Commission, there is no
justification for anonymity of sources, except for national security and law enforcement
investigations. The Commission has indicated that a prior disclosure that the identity
of information sources is available may decrease potential embarrassment and increase
investigative reporting accuracy. "A source that is aware that he may have to justify
his facts or opinions may be more circumspect in his statements." Privacy Hearings,
supra note 11, at 62.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(1) (1970).
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be revealed only if the investigative agency is sued for violating the
Act.10 9 During the Senate (S. 1840) Hearings, the disclosure issue
was hotly contested by the investigative agencies, which felt that giving
consumers the right to know who provided investigative information
would simply eliminate those sources in the future.'10 The fear of the.
investigative reporting interests is legitimate, for without the protection
of anonymity, certain sources of information, for example, landlords or
neighbors, might simply refuse to provide adverse information so as not
to breed either ill will or litigation. Alternatively, without adequate dis-
closure provisions, the consumer is faced with a privacy violation in the
form of an inability to control, or even to learn of the existence of, infor-
mation concerning him which is being disseminated.1 1'
Having established the consumer's right to privacy in the context of
consumer reporting-both credit and investigative-and the various
means necessary to protect that privacy, it now becomes necessary to
examine the means of enforcing those protections. The following
section investigates recent litigation in the consumer reporting field,
and analyzes the remedy provisions of the FCRA." 2 The section con-
cludes with a proposal on how to strengthen the remedial provisions
of the Act.
109. Id. § 1681g(a)(2).
110. In discussing the S. 1840 amendment requiring disclosure of investigative sources
to consumers, investigative reporting interests set forth the following fears and argu-
ments: (1) that disclosure requirements would dry up information sources since
individuals would refuse to cooperate if they knew they might be identified or subjected
to legal action; (2) that the investigative reporting system would be damaged, thereby
resulting in higher insurance costs to the consumer. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at
591, 681-86, 964. Cf. Comment, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest
for a Remedy, 57 GEo. L.J. 509, 512 n.27 (1969) (complications of disclosure would
slow down the business information process). An answer to the investigative reporting
interests was offered by Jeremiah S. Gutman, Chairman, American Civil Liberties Union
Privacy Committee, during the S. 1840 Hearings:
As long as we have a system which is so heavily dependent upon the use of con-
sumer reports, the people who are the potential victims of improper consumer re-
porting are entitled to confrontation with those persons who have anything adverse
to say about them, and if that good weighed on the scale on one side is balanced
against the harm which may possibly occur by a dry-up of some information on
the other hand, I would come down heavily on the side of the protection of due
process and confrontation.
S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 536.
111. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. Senator Proxmire achieved a viable
compromise of the disclosure issue in his latest FCRA amendments. CoMm. PRINT No.
2, supra note 34, at 3. The proposed "Fair Investigative Reporting Act" provides that
consumers will be given the opportunity to learn the sources of adverse information
which is not expunged after a dispute and reinvestigation. Id.
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o (1970).
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IV. CONSUMER REMEDIES
A. Litigation of Reporting Abuses
Prior to the passage of the FCRA, incorrect or misleading credit
reports were the source of most litigation by consumers against credit
reporting agencies. 13 Much of this litigation centered on claims of
defamation.' 14 Practically, the remedies available to the consumer were
largely ineffective; first, because the consumer reporting agencies were
afforded an absolute defense of truth," 5 and second, because even
where the consumer was able to show that the report was prima facie
defamatory, the reporting agency could escape liability by demonstrat-
ing that the reports were issued in good faith and in furtherance of
legitimate business objectives."-6
Subsequent to the passage of the FCRA, suits against mercantile
agencies for common law defamation or negligent credit reporting were
not permissible." 7  Instead, the Act provides the consumer with a
number of safeguards against defamatory credit reporting."" This
statutory prohibition against the traditional common law claims is of
little significance, however, in light of the ineffectiveness of the non-
statutory remedies." 9
One commentator found general agreement that the civil liability
provisions of the Act offer the wronged consumer a greater opportunity
for a compensatory recovery than he had in most jurisdictions prior to
the FCRA. 120 There are, however, factual situations to which the
FCRA civil liability provisions are inapplicable.' 2 ' In these instances,
the courts have held that state common law remedies will again apply.
113. FCRA: Constitutional Defects, supra note 62, at 427.
114. Id.
115. Truth is also an absolute defense in defamation actions, see W. PSossER,
HANDBOo OF THE LAW OF TORTS 776 (4th ed. 1971), but it was not at issue in most
cases, since the credit reports were clearly erroneous.
116. See generally FCRA: Constitutional Defects, supra note 62, at 427.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970).
118. Id. § 1681 et seq. Actions may be brought for willful or negligent
noncompliance with provisions of the Act. Examples include: (1) failure to disclose to
the consumer the existence 'of a report, id. § 1681d; (2) using a report for impermissible
purposes or using obsolete information, id. § 1681c; (3) failure to disclose on demand by
the consumer, id. § 1681g; (4) erroneously reporting information on the public record,
id. § 1681k; and (5) inaccurate reporting, id. § 1681i.
119. FCRA: Constitutional Defects, supra note 62, at 429.
120. FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point, supra note 11, at 482.
121. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o (1970); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d
54 (Ga. 1975).
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For example, in Retail Credit Co. v. Russell,122 the defendant credit
company released a libelous report to the plaintiff Russell's em-
ployer..2 3  The plaintiff was not hampered by common law defense
privileges' in establishing his claim, for under Georgia law' 25-unlike
the majority of jurisdictions-malice need not be proven, absent first
amendment considerations. 26 The plaintiff was, therefore, successful
in recovering $15,000 in damages against the defendant company.
In finding liability on the part of the credit company, the Georgia
Supreme Court recognized the plight of the individual consumer,
27
and at the same time dispelled all fears on the part of credit agencies
that the lack of a privilege will subject them to large damage awards,
thereby rendering them insolvent. 28 Although the plaintiff in Russell
was afforded relief, the case illustrates that if the situation were to arise
in another jurisdiction, the consumer might be left without an effective
remedy.'
29
B. Litigation of Abuses Under the FCRA
Even where the FCRA does apply to a particular factual situation,
it does not always serve as a viable remedy. 30 Civil actions brought
pursuant to the Act tend to result in nominal-if any-damages to the
122. 218 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1975).
123. The information reported by Retail Credit to Russell's employer contained, inter
alia, statements that Russell was "dismissed for dishonesty [from his prior job] and
would not be eligible for rehire" and that he "admitted taking money over a period of
time" from his former employer.
124. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
125. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-709 (1968).
126. All of the states, excluding Georgia and Idaho, recognize the conditional privi-
lege which requires the consumer to prove malice. Thus, where the defamation action is
not within the scope of the FCRA-where the consumer's discovery of the defamatory
report is not through the provisions of the FCRA (e.g., the consumer learns of the report
from his employer, a subscriber to the credit reporting agency)-the consumer is in no
more advantageous position than he was prior to the passage of the FCRA. Retail
Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Ga. 1975).
127. 218 S.E.2d at 58.
128. Id. at 59. One of the largest credit reporting and investigative reporting agencies
in the country, Retail Credit Co. (name changed to EQUIFAX, Inc. January 1, 1976), is
headquartered and doing business in Georgia. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 160.
129. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
130. It is difficult to get a proper perspective on legal activities involving the Act,
however, because there are relatively few reported cases. Cases involving jury verdicts are
without written opinions. Further, many cases involving serious abuses of the FCRA
are settled out of court without an easily available public record. S. 1840 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 33. Part of the reason for the paucity of litigation is that the FCRA is
directed toward giving the consumer his rights, yet does not give him the incentive to
exploit the honest mistakes of credit reporting agencies. S; 2360 Hearings) supra note
35, at 34.
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consumer-plaintiff.' 3 ' Therefore, there is little incentive on the part
of the consumer to bring an action under the statute,132 and as a result,
reporting agencies feel no real compulsion to comply with the
protective mechanisms of the Act.'33
The leading case brought pursuant to the FCRA, Millstone v. O'Han-
lon Reports, Inc.'3 illustrates the extent to which reporting agen-
cies still persist in willful noncompliance 36  with the accuracy and
disclosure provisions of the Act.'36 James Millstone, a reputable
journalist, was provided auto insurance coverage by the Fireman's
Fund Insurance Company. The insurer ordered an investigative report
on Millstone from O'Hanlon Reports. The report furnished contained
a number of highly derogatory accusations. 137  Due to the report,
Fireman's Fund directed its agent to cancel Millstone's policy. The
agent, however, advised Fireman's of Millstone's respectability and
the fact that he often covered the White House while at the
Post-Dispatch's Washington office. The insurance company withdrew
its cancellation order after learning these facts, but Millstone was
disturbed by the report and demanded a copy from O'Hanlon.'3 5
O'Hanlon refused, although it orally disclosed a synopsis of the re-
port to Millstone.
Upon Millstone's denial of the report's allegations, O'Hanlon rein-
vestigated and found them to be untrue.' 39  However, O'Hanlon per-
131. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4. In a statement by Albert Foer, it was noted that
plaintiffs have been unable to secure satisfactory monetary relief because of inherent
deficiencies in the civil damage provisions of the FCRA.
You can prove that the credit bureau didn't follow the law, but you may not be
able to recover anything for your efforts. The lack of minimum statutory damages
undoubtedly discourages consumers from going into court, and thereby deprives the
public of the private remedy as a means of enforcing the FCRA.
Id. at 41. (statement of Albert Foer).
See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o (1970), which outline the provisions for civil
damages for willful and negligent noncompliance with the Act. Nowhere is there a
minimum level for compensation.
132. FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point, supra note 11, at 484.
133. Id.
134. 383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1974), affd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1970).
136. Id. §§ 1681e(b), 1681g. See also Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924
(E.D. Mich. 1976).
137. 528 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1976).
138. For example, it was reported that he was strongly suspected of being a drug user,
and was disliked by his neighbors. Id.
139. O'Hanlon's agent devoted at most 30 minutes in preparing his report. His re-
port was rife with innuendo, misstatement, and slander. Indeed, the recheck of his
investigation shows that he depended solely on one biased informant; made no veri-
fication of the same despite O'Hanlon's requirement that there must be verification;
and, finally, it took three days to recheck the original investigation, and every alle-
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sistently refused to furnish Millstone with a copy of the report, and
actually failed to disclose all the contents of the report which eventually
came to light during discovery procedures. 140
The district court found that Millstone was entitled to $2,500 actual
damages, 4' and further assessed the credit agency $25,000 punitive
damages for its willful noncompliance with the FCRA.142  Attorney's
fees of $12,500 were also awarded.' 4 In affirming the district court's
judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that
O'Hanlon violated both the spirit and the letter of the FCRA by
recklessly disregarding Millstone's rights under the Act. 44
The Millstone appellate court helped to resolve two major issues
confronted by enforcement of the FCRA, as well as to demonstrate
the problems which could be avoided if the Act were strengthened in
the areas of consumer authorization and access to files. First, the case
involved the issue of whether consumer reports were "commercial
speech," which is not protected by the first amendment. 145  Neither
the district court nor the court of appeals found first amendment
protection. 40 The latter followed the test of constitutionality for
gation therein was found untrue ....
Not until Millstone brought pressure to bear, through the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and, ultimately, through this lawsuit, did O'Hanlon make the disclosure re-
quired by section 1681g.
Id. at 834.
140. Id. at 831.
141. 383 F. Supp. 269, 276 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
142. Id. Punitive damages are permitted under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(2) (1970).
143. 383 F. Supp. 269, 276 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
144. 528 F.2d 829, 835 (8th Cir. 1976).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The commercial speech doctrine was first enunciated in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942), but has not been a settled area of constitutional law. Millstone v.
O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 832 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'g 383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D.
Mo. 1974). For a very recent development concerning the first amendment commercial
speech doctrine, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 817 (1976) (first amendment protections may not be denied to commercial
speech merely because of the economic element).
146. The district court noted that four circuit courts of appeals have uniformly held
that the activities and publication of retail credit reports are not speech which should be
protected under the first amendment, adding, "[alny prospective chilling of First
Amendment freedoms should be looked at quite carefully by any court." Millstone v.
O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 274 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 829
(8th Cir. 1976). The court concluded that because the reports "were distributed for
commercial purposes and clearly without regard to social concerns or grievances," they
were "commercial speech" and thus fell outside the protective boundaries of the first
amendment. 383 F. Supp. at 274.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court, but further bolstered their holding
by examining the FCRA in light of the test set forth in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975). See note 147 infra and accompanying text.
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determining whether commercial speech is to be protected as was out-
lined in Bigelow v. Virginia.4 7  The court concluded that Congress
possessed authority to require both that O'Hanlon follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum accuracy of its reports, and that it
accurately disclose its file information to the consumer. 4
Second, the court of appeals held that actual damages could be de-
termined for mental pain and anxiety under the FCRA. 49 Prior to
this holding, it was generally feared that unless damages were allowed
for mental anguish, or unless presumptive general damages were
allowed, a consumer would have no practical ability to prove his case,
and thus would have no effective remedy against reporting abuses.'"
This possibility is most prevalent in the case of actions for negligent
noncompliance in which punitive damages are not permitted.' 5 l
147. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Bigelow involved the conviction of a newspaper editor
who printed an advertisement for a New York abortion referral service. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, thereby striking down the Virginia statute at issue. The
Court announced the following standard of review:
Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that
serves a legitimate public interest. . . . To the extent that commercial activity is
subject to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor,
among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against
the governmental interest alleged.
Id. at 826.
148. Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1976), aJfg
383 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
149. Id. at 834. The district court found that although Millstone did not lose wages or
incur medical expenses, he repeatedly had to contact O'Hanlon, and as a result he
suffered sleeplessness, nervousness and mental anguish. Thus, the court awarded Mill-
stone $2500.00 actual damages. Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269,
276 (E.D. Mo. 1974), afrd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
O'Hanlon claimed that its misconduct did not damage Millstone to the extent that he
recovered. In addition to belittling the injuries suffered by Millstone, O'Hanlon noted
that the incorrect investigative report was made for a mere sixty-eight dollar insurance
policy, that Millstone himself caused further publication of the incorrect report in news
stories about his problem with them, and that the insurance company did not believe the
report when confronted with the truth by Millstone's insurance agent. 528 F.2d at 834.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected O'Hanlon's arguments, and found
no abuse of discretion in the district court's award to Millstone. Id. at 835.
150. FCRA Negligent Noncompliance, supra note 67, at 1112. Civil suits are not
often a viable course of conduct for consumers to undertake under the FCRA because of
the necessity of proving actual damages. In most cases it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to prove actual damages due to a denial of credit or insurance benefits. In at
least one case the court dismissed a complaint with prejudice because the consumer could
not show actual damages from having been denied a credit card, even though the
reporting agency was proven negligent (Miller v. Credit Bureau [1969-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GnmE 99,173, at 89,067 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972)).
Calij. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1238 n. 19.
See Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 470; FCRA-Regulators Vantage Point, supra
note 11, at 484. Cf. Ackerley v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 661 (D. Wyo.
1974).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (1970).
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
The appellate court's decision suggests that-at least in the Eighth
Circuit-consumers now have a better opportunity to recover under the
Act. However, the consumer's burden of proof problem in establishing
actual damages not resulting from physical manifestations of mental
anguish remain. 152 How, for example, can a plaintiff-consumer prove
that he was damaged from having been denied a credit card due to
the negligence of a reporting agency?' 53 The court fails to resolve the
question; nor is the answer found in the FCRA.
Although Mr. Millstone managed to recover under the FCRA, the
case does underscore the deficiencies in the Act. The FCRA needs
two "preventive cures" to obviate the potential for abuses such as
those which occurred in Millstone. First, prior notification of the
existence of the investigative report would give the consumer the
opportunity to challenge and correct any misinformation before it was
distributed to a third party; before any damage could be done.1 4  Sec-
ond, providing the consumer with the right to obtain a copy of his file
would insure that any misinformation would be properly deleted or
corrected.' Without physicial access, the consumer is constantly
threatened by the situation that arose in Millstone: incomplete
disclosure of potentially damaging information.
Nitti v. Credit Bureau Inc.5 6 serves as an example of similar abuses
of FCRA provisions by credit bureaus who provide ledger data on
consumers. The defendant in Nitti was charged with repeatedly dis-
pensing an incorrect, obsolete credit report to local credit institutions
despite plaintiff's frequent attempts to correct the report. 5T In as-
sessing the credit bureau $10,000 in punitive damages, the trial court
emphasized the deterrent effect of its judgment on the defendant and
on others who may perpetrate similar acts against consumers. 58 It
152. See note 149 supra, and accompanying text.
153. See Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1238.
154. See S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 546-47, 625-26.
155. Id.; FCRA Negligent Noncompliance, supra note 67, at 1093.
Because consumer reports commonly contain records of lawsuits filed by or against the
subject of the report, a consumer may find himself with a "black mark" in his file if he
brings suit against a reporting agency. Strengthening the FCRA with a source disclosure
provision which does not require filing an action to learn the source of adverse informa-
tion will remove this potential bar to remedial action faced by consumers. FCRA
Negligent Noncompliance, supra note 67, at 1094 n.153.
156. 375 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1975).
157. Id. at 822. "Like a character in Kafka, he was totally powerless to move or
penetrate the implacable presence brooding, like some stone Moloch, within the Castle."
Id.
158. The Nitti court explained that the purpose of punitive damages is not only to
punish the wrongdoer and deter him from further wrongdoing, but also to deter others, to
protect the public. Id. at 820-21.
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appears that adding a "preventive cure" of insuring file accuracy
through minimum damage provisions might deter the kind of activity
which created problems for the plaintiff in Nitti.15 9 Such provisions
would essentially impose strict liability on credit bureaus for reporting
errors.
Since one out of every twenty reports may contain material errors,160
strict liability provisions would effectively force information merchants
to reduce their margin of error and insure accurate reporting. This
is especially necessary for violations associated with negligent report-
ing,16 1 since under the current FCRA negligence provision,16 2 punitive
damages are not available.
163
A decision from the court of civil appeals of Texas, Chilton Corp.
v. Moore,6 ' reinforces the need for strict liability provisions in the Act,
for it illustrates the hazards of placing the burden of proving abuses
on the party with the least awareness of-and access to-significant
evidence. Plaintiff-appellee sued defendant-appellant credit bureau
for negligently furnishing bad credit reports to several institutions.106
The trial court found that Chilton Corporation failed to "follow reason-
able procedures to assure maximum accuracy of the information con-
cerning the individual about whom the report relates."'' 6
On appeal, the trial court's determination that plaintiff had met his
burden of proof was upheld.' 67  Although Moore prevailed, the burden
of proof question in actions brought pursuant to the FCRA remains
159. While the awarding of liquidated damages in civil suits seeking redress for vio-
lations of consumer protection statutes is considered harsh by some, when such
damages are available the resultant degree of compliance is measurably enhanced.
The obvious example is the Truth in Lending Act, where the minimum $100 civil
liability for non-compliance has resulted in a high degree of compliance (see FTC
National Survey of Truth in Lending Compliance) and a substantial amount of pri-
vate civil activity ... Therefore, a similar approach is deemed essential to insure
a correspondingly high degree of compliance with the FCRA.
Privacy Hearings, supra note 11, at 471 (statement of the Federal Trade Commission).
160. Ackerley v. Credit Bureau Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D. Wyo. 1974). Cf.
FCRA Negligent Noncompliance, supra note 67, at 1129.
161. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (1970).
163. Id. § 1681n(2).
164. 508 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
165. Id. at 681.
166. Id. at 680, quoting 15 U.S:(C. § 1681e(b) (1970).
167. The court of appeals held that Moore did meet his burden of proof in showing
that: (1) the defendant gave him a very bad credit rating, and (2) the defendant took
no steps to assure the accuracy of bad credit information they had received from one of
Moore's creditors. 508 S.W.2d at 681-82.
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a significant problem.168  More often than not, it is the defendant
credit bureau which is in the better position to prove whether
procedures inside the company were reasonable to insure reporting
accuracy. 16 9 A shift in the burden of proof, similar to res ipsa loquitur
in negligence cases, would provide a greater "incentive" for credit
agencies to maintain accurate reporting standards.1
70
An ancillary issue raised in Chilton was whether a source who
supplies erroneous information to the consumer reporting agency
should be held liable under the FCRA. In Chilton, it was Sears
Roebuck that initially provided erroneous information to the defendant
credit bureau.' 7 ' The FCRA, however, does not create any alternative
liability for the sources of erroneous information provided to the re-
porting agencies.171 The FCRA immunity provision 73 will even bar
the use of common law remedies in such cases. 174  It appears that ex-
posing the source of information to liability would assure accuracy in
the furnishing of information. This exposure would help take the onus
off consumer reporting agencies who are provided with erroneous
information.
C. Regulating the Gathering of Irrelevant Personal Information
There is nothing in the FCRA which restricts the type of information
consumer reporting agencies can obtain and sell.' 75 As a result, infor-
mation that does not reasonably relate to the business purposes for
which the report was compiled finds its way into investigative
reports.'7 6 This irrelevant information is generally of a highly personal
168. The plaintiff had to use circumstantial evidence in order to substantiate his
claim, while the defendant credit manager had access to a wealth of information relating
to the accuracy of defendant's past investigation and reporting techniques. Id. at 682.
See also FCRA--Regulators Vantage Point, supra note 11, at 483.
169. 508 S.W.2d at 683. See also S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 545.
170. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 382 (4th ed. 1971).
171. 508 S.W.2d at 681. While the issue of whether an information supplier should
be liable for erroneous reporting emerges from the facts of the case, the court did not
address it in the opinion.
172. Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. Supp. 577, 583 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Bain
v. May Dept. Stores Co., 5 CCH CONSUMER CREDrr GUIDE 1 98,649, at 88,203 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1974) (retail store not held liable under either state or federal laws for making a
statement to a credit reporting agency which was used by a third party as the basis for
denying consumer credit).
See Calif. CRAA, supra note 2, at 1241-42.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970).
174. But cf. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 645-46.
175. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1970).
176. This problem results in an imbalance between the needs of the information
merchants and the legitimate privacy concerns of the individual consumer.
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nature, and enables prospective creditors, insurers, or employers to
make business decisions, in part, on the basis of personal bias. 1 7
The case of Galen Cranz serves as an example.""8 Ms. Cranz had
her automobile insurance cancelled on the basis of a report revealing
that she lived with a member of the opposite sex "without the benefit of
marriage."'1 79  This cancellation occurred despite the fact she had a
very good driving record, a respectable job and a dependable
income.'8 0 Considering her marital status irrelevant, she attempted,
unsuccessfully, to have it deleted from her file. Ms. Cranz finally filed
suit to have the information deleted. After a three year span and an
out-of-court settlement, both the reporting agency and the insurance
company' agreed to delete the information on the ground of irre-
levancy.'1
8
The experience of Ms. Cranz is not uncommon.8 2  Yet it would be
difficult to legislate standards of relevancy that would apply, for ex-
ample, to both automobile insurers and employers. To avoid this
problem, the FCRA should be amended to prohibit the reporting of
certain highly personal information, regardless of relevancy.1
3
The civil remedy provisions of the FCRA do not serve any deterrent
purpose, they only provide for liability after the fact. Each consumer
is responsible for policing the industry to uncover abuses relating to
his own personal file.1
4
The weaknesses in the Act, as exemplified in the preceding cases,
encourage the kind of investigatory practices that lead to invasions of
177. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 512.
178. The Cranz case was discussed before the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer
Affairs during the S. 1840 Hearings. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 511-19
(statement of Galen Cranz).
179. Id. at 513.
180. Id. at 514.
181. Id. at 513.
182. When asked whether or not she had any indication that her situation was
commonplace, Ms. Cranz replied that her attorney had been contacted by seven other
attorneys who reported having similar cases. She personally received thirty letters from
citizens in her situation. Id. at 518.
183. Ms. Cranz's attorney recommended prohibiting the inclusion in consumer reports
of certain kinds of information, whether relevant or not, for example, information about
certain life styles. Id. at 518.
184. [The FCRA], like the Clayton Act and the Truth-in-Lending Act (15 U.S.C.
§§1601 et seq. (1970)) among others, was enacted to enable private litigants to as-
sist in the enforcement of the Congressional purposes and, at the same time, recover
such damages as may have been inflicted upon them. The federal purpose is to
"create a species of 'private attorney general' to participate prominently in enforce-
ment."
Nitti v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 375 N.Y.S.2d 817, 824 (1975) (citations omitted). Cf. S.
1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 645.
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privacy,185 and fail to give the consumer an incentive to sue when an
invasion occurs. 8 6
D. State Legislation to Curb Invasions of Consumer Privacy
Many states have enacted consumer credit and investigative re-
porting legislation which provides greater protection to individuals'
87
through stronger access, disclosure and relevancy measures.188  How-
ever, a significant preemption problem may exist. For example, in
Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County,8 9 the Southern District of Florida
held that a local ordinance which gave consumers greater protection
than the FCRA was inconsistent with the Act.' 90 The district court
determined that the ordinance's requirements for disclosure of investi-
gative sources, disclosure of medical information, and its removal of the
qualified immunity privilege were unenforceable. The court based
its reasoning on the legislative history of the FCRA.' 91  At least one
commentator has viewed the decision as incorrect, but noted that if it
is followed elsewhere, more protective state regulations may be struck
down.
192
Whether or not other federal courts will follow Retail Credit is an
open question; but the option could be eliminated by amending the
FCRA preemption provision 19' to prevent a finding by any court that
a state law which affords greater protection to the consumer would be
inconsistent with the FCRA. 19 4
185. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
186. For example, a person seeking a loan or a job may be faced with the problem of
getting quick action to change an erroneous consumer report that the immediate transac-
tion depends on. If he must litigate to change the report, the loan or job opportunity
may be lost. Thus, in order to effectively aid the consumer faced with the immediacy of
adverse action to obtain relief, the FCRA should provide the consumer with a priority
action to prevent him from being damaged by the erroneous report.
187. 1 CCH CONSUMER C.rr GuiDE 680, at 2901-2917 (1976). For an analysis
of the various state consumer credit laws, see generally Little Brother Is Watching, supra
note 6, at 821-23.
188. See generally Little Brother Is Watching, supra note 6, at 821-23. Cf. Privacy
Hearings, supra note 11, at 275.
189. 393 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
190. Id. at 582-84.
191. Id. See note 4 supra and accompanying text
192. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 79 (reply by Albert Foer to question directed
by Senator Proxmire).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (1970).
194. S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 80. But cf. id. at 677.
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The latest proposed FCRA amendments, consisting of Senator
Proxmire's "Fair Investigative Reporting Act,"1 5 arose in response to
suggestions and criticisms made during the S. 1840 Hearings.100 The
latter sought to strengthen present FCRA provisions relating to both
credit reports and investigative reports, but the Committee Print deals
only with investigative reports, thereby bifurcating the Act into two
titles.117 The proposed Fair Investigative Reporting Act alleviates the
privacy protection problems examined in this Comment, 98 however,
it still lacks a comprehensive preemption requirement.0 9 Further, bifur-
cation of the present FCRA will not be completely effective unless the
new Fair Credit Reporting Act provides consumers with remedial
safeguards comparable to those in the proposed Fair Investigative
Reporting Act. °00 Specifically, amendments are needed to provide
minimum damages for willful or negligent noncompliance with the FCRA
by the distributors, users, and sources of credit information. The de-
terrent effect of such a provision will help insure the accuracy in re-
porting which is vital to the preservation of privacy.
201
195. Comm. Pnir No. 2, supra note 34.
196. Id. at 2.
197. Id.
198. The following excerpt from Committee Print No. 2 summarizes the pro-
posed privacy protection measures of the Fair Investigative Reporting Act:
1. Where the present law only requires that consumers be notified of an investi-
gative report after it has been ordered, the Committee print would require that con-
sumers be told in advance and that consumers affirmatively authorize any such re-
ports; except fraud or claims reports.
2. Before any medical information is obtained (usually by an insurance com-
pany) the consumer must be told whether such information will be relayed on to
a consumer reporting agency for storage, there to be available to other insurance
companies. The medical authorization form must identify any such reporting agen-
cies.
3. Consumer reporting agencies will be required to adopt reasonable procedures
to assure the relevancy, as well as the accuracy, of information collected. Unrea-
sonable "quota" systems and deceptive practices are specifically prohibited.
4. Consumers will be entit [sic] to physically inspect their files, or to get disclo-
sure of file contents by mail as well as by phone or personal visit. Consumers will
also be able to get copies of file material, and to learn the sources of information
which is [sic] not expuiged after a reinvestigation.
5. Under the present law, consumers must be notified only when credit or in-
surance is denied or the cost is increased as a result of a consumer report. The
Committee Print expands this so that "any adverse action" based on a report will
obligate the user to tell the consumer his rights and identify the reporting agency.
6. The present law does not call for regulations to be issued. The Print directs
the Federal Trade Commission to promulgate regulations.
7. In the Committee Print the civil liability provisions are modified to set mini-
mum recoveries for willful or negligent violations, and a limited immunity from def-
amation or negligence suits is provided for consumer reporting agencies or report
users who act in compliance with the new title.
Id. at 3.
199. See note 194 supra and accompanying text.
200. See Covm. PlrT No. 2, supra note 34, at 3.
201. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
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The new California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act 22 and
Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act2 °s may provide the
best models on which to base new federal legislation. They insure ade-




Recent litigation and legislative hearings have pointed out the need
for amending the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Striking an optimum
balance between the privacy interests of the consumer and the legiti-
mate needs of the merchants is a difficult task. Perhaps the greatest
obstacle facing the improvement of consumer protections is the cost
factor: increased consumer protection will mean increased operating
costs for the information merchants, and ultimately, increased costs for
the consumer seeking benefits.20 5 Yet in light of the reporting
industry abuses outlined in this Comment, it is apparent that the Act
must be strengthened.
Birfurcation of the FCRA will undoubtedly render it more efficient.
The characteristic differences between investigative and credit report-
ing necessitate different regulatory measures. Amendments providing
for greater notification, greater access to information, and restrictions
on the type of information permitted in consumer reports, will afford
the consumer the control necessary to assure the accuracy of his file
information. Fortifying the liability sections of the Act with mini-
mum damages provisions will deter violations of consumer privacy,
promote accurate reporting, and insure adequate redress to consumers
whose rights are violated by the information merchants. With these
statutory tools at his disposal, the consumer will be better able to educate
himself concerning any personal information on file. Moreover, he will
be better equipped to enforce his fundamental right of privacy.
Lawrence D. Frenzel
202. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.1 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
203. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1786 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
204. See also PAC. L.J. REvIEw OF SELECTED 1975 CALIF. LEaISLATION 347, 348
(1975).
205. The argument is continually made by those who would diligently and effi-
ciently accomplish results, that costs will go up and that things will be so efficient-
well, that's one of the consequences of operating under the constitutional system
and what we are here doing is attempting through legislation such as is now before
the committee to impose upon a certain sector of our economy principles of due
process which we have imposed upon other sectors.
S. 1840 Hearings, supra note 4, at 536-37 (statement of Jeremiah S. Gutman, Chairman,
American Civil Liberties Union Privacy Committee). See id. at 11, 81, 624. For the
information merchants' attitude on increasd "consumer protection costing the consumer
more, see generally id. at 576, 742.
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